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CESL AND CISG 
Ingeborg SCHWENZER* 
Survß1ARY: I. Introduction. II. Scope of application. III. The Ten-
sion Between Certainty and Fairness. rv. Amended rules. V. Filling the 
gaps. VI. Codifying style and techniques. VII. Conclusion. 
l. lNTRODUCTION 
On 11 October 2011, the European Commission published the Proposal for 
a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Com-
mon European Sales Law. This Common European Sales Law1 -CESL- is 
based on the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR),2 which in turn 
drew heavily on the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL).3 CESL 
contains provisions on contract formation, contract interpretation including 
unfair contract terms and -as its core part- obligations and remedies of 
the parties to a sales contract. 4 Furthermore, provisions on damages and in-
terest, restitution as weil as prescription can be found. Thus, the sphere of 
application of the CESL is more or less identical with the UN Convention on 
* Dr. iur. (Freiburg, gerrnany), L.L.M. (Berckeley, USA), Professor for Private 
Law, University of Basel, Switzerland. The author is deeply indebted to Mr. 
Phillippe Monnier, MLaw, attorney at law, for his assistance in the preparation 
of this article. All web pages were the last accessed on March 3lst 2012. 
1 The CESL forms Annex I of the Regulation. After the publication of the Proposal, 
the European authorities received reasoned opinions from the Austrian Federal Council, the 
Belgian Senate, the German Bundestag and the United Kingdom House of Commons, re-
spectively, objecting to CESL on the grounds that it infringed the subsidiarity principle. The 
threshold for an automatic review of the draft was, however, not met (see http://www.ipex.eu/ 
IPEXL-WEB/dossier/dossier.do?code=COD&year=201 l&number=0284&appLng=EN). 
2 Von Bar, C. et al. (eds.), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules ef European Private La~ Drojt 
Common Frame ef Reference (DCFR), Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich, 2009. 
3 Principles of European Contract Law (PECL) (1999), available at http:/ ijrontpage.cbs. 
dk/law/commission_ on_european_contract_law/PECL %2 Oengelsk/ engelsk_partl_og_IL htm. 
4 For a general overview of CESL see D. Staudenmayer, 'Der Kommissionsvorschlag 
für eine Verordnung zum Gemeinsamen Europäischen Kaufrecht', NJW, Vol. 64, 2011, pp. 
3491 et seq. 
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2. Sales of Goods Contracts Defi,ned 
Both instruments govern sales of goods contracts. However, their res-
pective scopes diff er substantially. 
The CISG does not define the term "goods" itself. Thus, the scope of 
this notion must be interpreted autonomously. From the very beginning, it 
has been highly debated whether the sale of software is governed by the 
CISG or not. Io The ndw prevailing view holds that the CISG applies if 
software is permanently transferred to the buyer, irrespective of the mode 
in which the software is delivered, e.g. via disc or, as usually today, via the 
internet. II Thus, the CISG has been able to easily adjust to ever-changing 
modern electronic developments. 
The CESL, in contrast, still defines goods as "arry tangi,ble movable items", I2 
thus explicitly excluding software. This narrow and rather outdated defini-
tion of goods requires that, in addition to "sale of goods", the "supply of 
digital content" has to be mentioned separately in all relevant provisions. I3 
Another difference relates to so-called mixed contracts. In this respect, 
the CISG follows a rather pragmatic approach. 
According to article 3(2) CISG, the CISG applies to a mixed contract if 
the supply of labour or other services does not form the preponderant part 
of the obligations. If the whole contract is governed by the CISG, its provi-
sions also apply to the service part. Thus, ajudge or arbitrator does not have 
to decide whether the fact that the goods do not live up to the contractual 
requirements results from their own features or from a possible breach of a 
service obligation. 
Again, the approach taken by the CESL is different. I4 It only applies to 
so-called related services, i.e. any service related to the goods or digital con-
Press, Oxford, 2010, article 6, para. 4; see also Hesselink, M„ "How to Opt into the Common 
European Sales Law? Brief Comments on the Commission's Proposal for a Regulation", 
European Review ef Private Law, Vol. 20, 2012, p. 201. 
10 Schwenzer, I. and Hachem, P., in Schwenzer 2010, supra note 9, Art. 1, Para. 18. 
11 !dem; see also Kee, C„ 'Rethinking the Common Law Definition of Goods', in Büchler, 
A. and Müller-Chen, M. (eds.), Private Law, national-globa/;-- comparative, Festschriftfor Ingeborg 
Schwenzer zum 60. Geburtstag, Stämpfli, Bern, 2011, pp. 930 et seq. 
12 See article 2(h) Regulation. 
13 For the definition of digital content see article 26) Regulation; see further Feltkamp, R. 
and Vanbossele, F., "The Optional Common European Sales Law: Better Buyer's Remedies 
for Seller's Non-performance in Sales of Goods?", European Review ef Private Law, Vol. 19, 
2011, pp. 879 et seq. 
14 See also Micklitz, H. W. and Reich, N„ "The Commission Proposal for a Regulation 
on a Common European Sales Law (CESL)-Too Broad or Not Broad Enough?", in Micklitz, H. 
W. and Reich, N. (eds.), The Commission Proposal.for a "Regulation on a Common European Sales 
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tent such as installation, maintenance, repair or processing, but explicitly 
excludes training services15 that ordinarily play an important role in more 
complex sales contracts on the international level. 16 Furthermore, even 
if the mixed contract is covered by the CESL, there is a distinct liability 
scheme for the breach of a service obligation. Whereas liability for breach 
of the delivery obligation under the CESL is strict, liability for breach of a 
service obligation depends on fault. 17 This means that the adjudicator faces 
the often unresolvable task of exactly attributing the consequences of non-
conformity to the goods themselves or the services part of the contract. 
3. B2B and B2C Contracts 
In regard to the personal scope, the CISG is pretty straightforward: it 
is concerned with international B2B sales contracts, B2C transactions are 
practically excluded. 18 
Again, the approach taken by the CESL is different. The starting point 
is the cross-border European B2C sales contract, and indeed the whole ins-
trument exudes the underlying policy of consumer protection, which is one 
of the main goals of unification of private law at the European level. The 
Explanatory Memorandum explicitly states that the Proposal "is consistent with 
the objective ef attaining a high level ef consumer protection"19 The second aim is to 
help small or medium-sized enterprises (SME) to benefit more from oppor-
tunities offered by the internal market. 20 According to article 7 Regulation, 
the CESL may be used in B2B contracts only if at least one of the parties 
is a SME.21 lt remains an open question why the CESL, as an opting-in ins-
trument, cannot be chosen by two commercial entities if neither qualifies as 
Law (CESL)"- Too Broad or Not Broad Enough?, EUI Working Paper LAW 2012/04, European 
University Institute, San Domenico di Fiesole, 2012, pp. 12 et seq. 
15 See article 2(m) Regulation; see also article 6 Regulation: exclusion of mixed-purpose 
contracts. 
16 See farther N. Reich, ''.An Optional Sales Law Instrument for European Business and 
Consumers?'', in Micklitz, H. W. and Reich, N„ supra note 14, 2012, pp. 85 et seq„ p. 89: 
"The scope and content of part V on Services related to a sales contract seem to be incomplete, 
contradictory and will not provide legal certainty of cross-border B2C transactions (. „)". 
17 Article 148(2) CESL. 
18 Article 2(a) CISG; see Schwenzer, I. and Hachem, P., in Schwenzer, supra note 9, 2010, 
article 2, paras. 4 et seq. 
19 P. 6. 
20 See Explanatory Memorandum, p. 7. 
21 According to Art. 7(2) Regulation, a SME is a trader with less than 250 employees and 
an annual turnover not exceeding 50 million Euros. 
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a SME.22 Furthermore, the CESL seems to assume that, in B2B sales con-
tracts, the SME -like the consumer-- is always on the side of the buyer, 
which certainly is not the case in reality. 
4. SubJects Covered 
As we all know, the CISG is only concerned with the formation of the 
contract, the right~ and duties of the parties and the remedies in case of 
breach of contract. Issues of limitation of actions are covered by the CISG's 
sister UN Convention on the Limitation Period in the International Sale of 
Goods, which, however, has not gained wide approval. There are significant 
areas not covered by the CISG, especially validity issues. 23 
The CESL, in addition to the areas covered by the CISG and the Limi-
tation Convention, fills some of the open or at least perceived gaps left by 
the CISG. Apart from the right to withdraw in B2C contracts,24 it deals with 
mistake, fraud, threat and exploitation, 25 addresses unfair contract terms, 26 
and prolifically regulates pre-contractual information duties.27 Still, signifi-
cant areas of general contract law are not covered by the CESL and thus 
are left to the otherwise applicable domestic law. 28 
III. THE TENSION BETWEEN CERTAINTY AND FAIRNESS 
One of the major problems each commercial contract law system has to 
face is the tension between certainty and predictability on the one side and 
22 However, the Member States may open the CESL for other parties than SME; see 
also Mankowski, P., "Der Vorschlag für ein Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht (CESL) ", 
Internanonales Handelsrecht, Vol. 12, 2012, p. 3; Eidenmüller, H. et al., "Der Vorschlag für eine 
Verordnung über ein Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht",Juristen .Zeitung, Vol. 67, 2012, 
pp. 273 et seq.; Scottish Law Commission, 'An Optional Common European Sales Law: Ad-
vantages and Problems', November 2011, available at http://lawcommissionJusnce.gov.uk/docs/ 
Common_European_Sales_La.w_Advice.pdf, p. 88. 
23 Article 4, sentence 2(a) CISG; see in detail Schwenzer, I. and Hachem, P., in Schwen-
zer 2010, supra note 9, article 4, paras. 29 et seq. 
24 Articles 40-4 7 CESL. 
25 Articles 48-57 CESL; see on these issues Martens, A. E., "Die Regelung der Willens-
mängel im Vorschlag für eine Verordnung über ein Gemeinsames Europäisches Kaufrecht", 
Archivfar die civilistische Praxis, Vol. 211, 2011, pp. 845 et seq. 
25 Articles 82-86 CESL. 
27 Articles 13-22 CESL; see De Boeck, A., "B2B Information Duties in the Feasibility 
Study: Analysis of Article 23", European Review of Private Law, Vol. 19, 2011, pp. 790 et seq. 
28 For further criticism see Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, 2012, pp. 271 et seq. 
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fairness on the other side. Shall the parties be bound to what they agreed or 
shall the adjudicator be granted the power to interfere with their agreement 
on grounds of fairness and conscionability? Already in 1598, Shakespeare 
put this question in the centre of his play "The merchant of Venice". ls An-
tonio bound to his promise of "a pound of flesh" in case of not being able 
to repay the loan or is this an unfair contract term to be disregarded under 
the circumstances?29 
lt is one of the most salient f eatures of English commercial law that it 
strongly favours certainty over fairness whereas many civil law legal systems 
tend to rely on notions of good faith and fair dealing. lt was against this 
background that in the ClSG "the observance of good jaith in international trade" 
was only inserted in article 7(1) ClSG as one criterion among others tobe 
taken into consideration in interpreting the Convention. However, the draf-
ters of the ClSG explicitly decided against any provision imposing a duty of 
good faith on the parties themselves. Thus, in particular, the German notion 
of Treu und Glauben cannot be applied under the ClSG although German 
courts and authors seem to sometimes disregard this fact. 30 By contrast, the 
CESL explicitly states that each party has a duty to act in accordance with 
good faith and fair dealing. 31 Any breach of this duty may not only preclude 
the breaching party from exercising or relying on a right, remedy or defence 
which it would otherwise have but may in and of itself give rise to liability 
for any loss thereby caused to the other party. 32 This far reaching principle 
is hardly reconcilable with the necessity of certainty and predictability in 
commercial transactions and thus will certainly not be acceptable at least to 
most Common Law lawyers. 33 
Iv. AMENDED RULES 
Let us now turn to some core areas of any sales legislation where the 
CESL chose to deviate from the ClSG. 
29 See Scottish Law Commission, supra note 22, 2011, p. 106. , 
30 See Schwenzer I. and Hachem, P., in Schwenzer, supra note 9, 2010, Art. 7, Para. 17. 
31 Article 2(1) CESL. 
32 Article 2(2) CESL. 
33 See Scottish Law Commission, supra note 22, 2011, pp. 106 et seq„ p. 113; see further 
Hofmann, N., "Interpretation Rules and Good Faith as Obstacles to the UK's Ratification 
of the CISG and to the Harmonization of Contract Law in Europe'', Pace Int'l L Rev., Vol. 
22, 2010, pp. 159 et seq. 
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1. Non-conformiry ef the Goods 
The litmus test for any sales law are the rules on non-conformity of the 
goods.34 
The CISG offers clear and convincing solutions in this regard which 
have in many instances proven to yield satisfactory results. Consequently, 
these provisions have served as a role. model for domestic35 as weil as the 
European legislator. 36 The CISG rules emphasise the importance of the con-
tract being the first and foremost reference point for the conformity of the 
goods. 37 Only if the parties have not made contractual provisions for any 
specific features of the goods does the CISG establish subsidiary presump-
tions to decide whether the goods conform to the contract. 38 
Without any obvious necessity, the CESL has deviated from the con-
vincing concept of the CISG.39 In particular, it should be noted that de-
viations were not dictated by consumer protection. Firstly, the CESL does 
not recognise the important distinction between contractual designation of 
conformity and the statutory default rule.40 Instead, it requires the goods 
to comply with contractual requirements as weil as the default criteria for 
non-conformity,41 thus relying on a mixed subjective/ objective approach.42 
This may weil lead to absurd results as goods may be perfectly conforming 
to contractual requirements but not pass the objective test. Foodstuff that 
is no langer fit for human consumption may weil be sold as animal food. 
34 Fora comparative overview of the different approaches to non-conforrnity see Sch-
wenzer, I. et al., Global Sales and Contract Ltzw, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, Paras. 
31.26 et seq. 
35 The approach taken by the CISG has been followed by modern and recently mod-
ernized legal systems in Central Europe, the Nordic systems as weil as Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia; see Schwenzer et al., supra note 34, 2012, para. 31.45, with further references. 
36 In particular, article 2 of the Directive 99/44/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 May 1999 on Certain Aspects of the Sale of Consumer Goods and 
Associated Guarantees was based on article 35 CISG, which has thus found its way into all 
domestic legal systems which have implemented the Directive. 
37 See Article 35(1) CISG. 
38 See Article 35(2) CISG. 
39 See also Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, 2012, p. 280, according to whom the draft-
ers of CESL should have adopted the provisions of article 35 CISG rather than experiment-
ing with the notion of conformity. 
40 This is also evidenced by the very order in article 66 CESL that suggests that the non-
mandatory rules of CESL prevail over implied terms of the contract. 
41 See Articles 99, 100 CESL; see also Feltkamp and Vanbossele, supra note 13, 2011, 
pp. 886 et seq. 
42 Feltkamp and Vanbossele, idem. 
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Goods without a CE label that may not be sold in the EU may perfectly be 
fit for export to other regions in the world. 43 Furthermore, in addition to the 
long list of subjective and objective criteria, Art. 1 OO(g) CESL contains a 
catch-all provision requiring the goods to "possess such qualities and peiformance 
capabilities as the bl!Jer may expecf'. How these expectations are to be assessed 
remains largely obscure. 44 
Both the CISG and the CESL require the goods to be free from any 
right or claim of a third party including those that are based on industrial or 
other intellectual property.45 However, whereas under the CISG it is nowa-
days unanimously held46 that any claim by a third party triggers the seller's 
liability, the CESL limits the seller's liability to cases where the claims are 
not obviously unfounded.47 
In a B2B contract both under the CISG and under the CESL, the buyer 
can only rely on any lack of conformity if it gave notice to the seller after a 
proper examination of the goods. 48 At the Vienna Conference these provi-
sions were highly debated leading to the well-known compromise that if the 
buyer has an excuse for not having examined the goods or giving proper 
notice it may still reduce the price or claim damages except for loss of prof-
it. 49 Under the CESL, instead of offering a better protection to SME buy-
ers -as envisaged- the prerequisites for examination and notice are even 
higher.50 Examination must be undertaken within a rigid 14 days from the 
date of delivery of the goods51 and there is no exception in case of reason-
able excuse. A further change for the worse as regards the position of the 
buyer is the fact that the notice in any case must reach the seller to become 
effective52 whereas under the CISG53 the seller bears the risk that the notice 
is lost or delayed in transit. 
43 See for the interplay of the CE mark and conformity of the goods Schwenzer, I., 
supra note 9, article 35, para. 14. 
seq. 
44 For similar criticism see Feltkamp and Vanbossele, supra note 13, 2011, p. 887. 
45 See article 42 CISG; article 102 CESL. 
46 See Schwenzer, I„ supra note 9, article 41, para. 10, article 42, para. 6. 
47 Article 102(1) CESL; see also Feltkamp and Vanbossele, supra note 13, p. 888. 
48 Articles 38, 39, 43 CISG; Articles 121, 122 CESL. 
49 Article 44 CISG. 
50 Articles 121, 122 CESL; see also Feltkamp and Vanbossele, supra note 13, pp. 895 et 
51 Article 121(1) CESL. 
52 Article 10(3) CESL. 
53 Article 27 CISG. 
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2. Remedies 
The second core area of any sales law codification is the issue of rem-
edies in case of breach of contract.54 The CISG and CESL agree on the 
basic structure of remedies, as they apply the remedy-oriented approach 
rather than the old Roman cause-oriented approach. 55 Upon closer analysis 
of the remedies, however, remarkable diff erences appear. 
A. Specijic Performance 
The first remedy to discuss is specific performance. 56 lt is weil known 
that the CISG has not bridged the gap between Common Law57 and Civil 
Law58 legal systems concerning the general remedy of specific performance. 
Instead, it leaves it to the court or arbitral tribunal to decide whether it en-
ters ajudgment for specific performance.59 lt has tobe emphasised that this 
compromise has not given rise to difficulties in practice. 60 In accord with 
continental legal thinking, the CESL, from a systematic perspective, instead 
seems to envisage specific performance as the primary remedy. 61 Thus, the 
principal provision for the buyer's right to specific performance does not 
54 See Wilhelm, C., "Die Rechtsbehelfe des Käufers bei Nichterftlllung nach dem Vor-
schlag der Europäischen Kommission für eine Verordnung über ein Gemeinsames Europä-
isches Kaufrecht (KOM, 2011, 635 endg.)", Internationales Handelsrecht, Vol. 11, 2011, p. 226; 
Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, 2012, pp. 280 et seq.; Feltkamp and Vanbossele, supra note 
13, 2011, pp. 897 et seq.J· Scottish Law Commission, supra note 22, 2011, pp. 59 et seq.; see 
further, for a comparative overview, Schwenzer et al„ supra note 34, 2012, Paras. 41. 01 et seq. 
55 See Samoy, I. et al., "Don't Find Fault, Find a Remedy'', European Review ef Private 
La.w, Vol. 19, 2011, pp. 862 et seq.; Schwenzer et al., supra note 34, paras. 41.45 et seq.; for a 
comparison of CISG and CESL regarding the seller's right to eure see Kruisinga, S., "The 
Seller's Right to Cure in the CISG and the Common European Sales Law", European Review 
ef Private La.w, Vol. 19, 2011, pp. 911 et seq. 
56 See generally Schwenzer et al., supra note 34, paras. 43.01 et seq. 
57 Jbidem, 43.24 et seq. 
58 Ibidem, paras. 43.11 et seq. 
59 See article 28 CISG: "If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one 
party is entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a court is not 
bound to enter a judgement for specific performance unless the court would do so under its 
own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention". 
60 Müller-Chen, M., in Schwenzer, supra note 10, 2010, article 28, para. 4. 
61 Wilhelm, supra note 54, 2011, p. 226; see also Scottish Law Commission 2011 (supra 
note 22), pp. 65 et seq.; Samoy & Dang Vu &Jansen, supra note 55, 2011, p. 869; see further, 
on the DCFR, De Vries, G„ "Right to Specific Performance: Is There a Divergence between 
Civil- and Common-Law Systemsand, If So, How Ras It Been Bridged in the DCFR?", 
European Review ef Private La.w, Vol. 17, 2009, pp. 596 et seq.; Stürner, M., "Die Grenzen der 
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contain any truly relevant restrictions.62 A reasonable restriction of the rem-
edy of specific performance in cases where the creditor should resort to a 
substitute transaction is not provided in the context of the buyer's right to 
specific performance, but only for the respective right of the seller in case 
of breach of contract by the buyer. 63 lt appears doubtful whether such an 
approach is acceptable to any Common Law lawyer. 
A special form of specific performance in case of non-conformity of 
the goods is repair and replacement. 64 The CISG restricts the seller's ob-
ligation to replace non-conforming goods to cases where non-conformity 
amounts to a fundamental breach of contract in order to avoid costly and 
unreasonable transportation of the goods. 65 This restriction is not found in 
the CESL, not even for a B2B contract. lt may be questionable whether 
this makes commercial sense between a Lithuanian seller and a Portuguese 
buyer. lt certainly cannot serve as a model on the global scale. 
B. Avoidance ef Contract 
In B2B contracts, both the CISG as weil as the CESL in principle allow 
avoidance of contract in case of a fundamental breach of contract supple-
mented by the so-called Nackfrist-principle. 66 In B2C contracts, however, un-
der the CESL the consumer may avoid the contract for any non-conformity 
unless the lack of conformity is insignificant. 67 
Primärleistungspflicht im Europäischen Vertragsrecht", European Review of Private Law, Vol. 
19, 2011, pp. 180 et seq. 
62 See article 110(3) CESL: exclusion of specific performance only where it is impossible 
or unlawful or where the burden to the seller is disproportionate to the benefit for the buyer; 
see further Feltkamp and Vanbossele, supra note 13, 2011, p. 897. For the general exceptions 
from specific performance in Civil Law legal systems see Schwenzer et al., supra note 34, 
paras. 43.20 et seq. 
63 Article 132(2) CESL. 
64 See Feltkamp and Vanbossele, supra note 13, 2011, p. 898; Samoy et al., supra note 55, 
2011, p. 869. 
65 See article 46(2) CISG; see further Schwenzer et al., supra note 34, paras. 49 .15 et seq. 
66 Buyer: article 49 CISG, articles 114(1), 115 CESL; seller: article 64 CISG, articles 
134, 135 CESL; see further Wilhelm, supra note 54, 2011, p. 230; Feltkamp and Vanbossele, 
supra note 13, 2011, pp. 899 et seq.; Schwenzer et al., supra note 34, Paras. 47 .112 et seq. 
67 Article 114(2) CESL; see Eidenmüller et al., supra note 22, 2012, p. 282; Feltkamp and 
Vanbossele, supra note 13, 2011, p. 901; Wilhelm, supra note 54, 2011, p. 231; see further 
Scottish Law Commission, supra note 22, 2011, pp. 60 et seq., criticizing that the consumer's 
right to avoid the contract is too long and too uncertain. 
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Both sets of rules use an essentially identical definition for the funda-
mentality of the breach. 68 However, the CESL goes one step further by 
holding that fundamentality is also given where the breach of contract is 
of such a nature as to make it clear that the non-performing party's fu-
ture performance cannot be relied on. 69 Whether such a future breach itself 
amounts to a fundamental one is immaterial. 
C. Damages 
The rules on damages in the CESL7° by and large follow those of the 
CISG. 71 However, the CESL now contains an explicit provision that non-
economic loss may only be compensated for as far as it results from pain and 
suffering. Other non-economic lasses are excluded. 72 The CISG, in contrast, 
does not contain a similar restriction, leaving it to further legal development 
whether and which non-economic lass may be compensated. 73 
3. Force Mqjeure and Hardship 
Both the CISG as well as the CESL provide that the debtor is exempted 
from liability for damages in case of an impediment beyond its control. 74 
The CESL force mqjeure provision can be regarded as being more or less 
equivalent to that of the CISG. However, the CESL does not discuss force 
mqjeure in the chapter on damages but rather in a Chapter dealing with 
"General provisions". 75 
68 See article 25 CISG; article 87(2)(a) CESL. 
69 Article 87(2)(b) CESL. 
70 Articles 159-165 CESL, supplemented by article 2( c) Regulation; see further Eiden-
müller et al., supra note 22, 2012, pp. 282 et seq.; Feltkamp and Vanbossele, supra note 13, 
2011, p. 903; Wilhelm, supra note 54, 2011, pp. 232 et seq. 
71 Articles 74-77 CISG; see generally Schwenzer et al„ supra note 34, paras. 44.01 et seq. 
72 Article 2(c) Regulation; see further Scottish Law Commission, supra note 22, 2011, 
pp. 64 et seq., criticizing the restriction as a reduction in consumer protection. 
73 See Schwenzer, I„ supra note 9, article 74, paras. 18 et seq., para. 39; Schwenzer I. 
and Hachem, P. "The Scope of the CISG Provisions on Damages", in Cunnington, R. and 
Saidow, D. (eds.), Contract Damages: Domestic and International Perspectives, Hart Publishing, Ox-
ford, 2008, p. 100. 
74 Article 79 CISG; article 88(1) CESL; see Wilhelm, supra note 54, 2011, pp. 232 et seq.; 
see further Schwenzer et al„ supra note 34, paras. 45.01 et seq. 
75 Chapter 9, articles 87-90 CESL. 
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Furthermore, it has to be emphasised here once more that, as regards 
service obligations, the CESL follows the fault-based approach of Roman 
Law descent. Thus, in these cases, the seller is exempted from liability if 
there was no fault on its part. 
Unlike the CISG, the CESL contains a specific provision on variation 
or termination by court in case of a change of circumstances commonly re-
f erred to as hardship. 76 For various reasons, this provision is not convincing. 
First, it seems pref erable to deal with both force maJeure and hardship und er 
the same provision as it is clone under the CISG. 77 All too often, drawing 
the line betweenforce mqjeure and hardship is not possible. Most subsequent 
events do not render performance impossible and thus do not constitute 
a veritable impediment; they just render performance more onerous for 
the debtor. The prerequisites as weil as the consequences for both cas-
es should be the same. Especially, contrary to what the CESL suggests,78 
there should be no difference between an initial hardship and hardship 
caused by a change of circumstances subsequent to the conclusion of the 
contract. Under the CESL, in case of initial hardship, the debtor would 
have to rescind the contract for mistake. Finally, the consequences of hard-
ship laid down in the CESL are unsatisfactory - at least with regard to sales 
contracts. The parties' duty to renegotiate79 as weil as a possible adjustment 
of the contract80 to the changed circumstances by a court or arbitral tribu-
nal is of practical use only in long-term relationships but usually not in sales 
contracts. All in all, here again, the results achievable under the CISG are 
more satisfactory than those under the CESL. 81 
76 Article 89 CESL; see further Schwenzer et al., supra note 34, paras. 45. l 0 et seq., 45. 76 
et seq. 
77 The modernised German law of obligations also contains independent rules on im-
possibility (§ 27 5 CC) and hardship (§ 313 CC). In particular, the relationship between the 
provision on impossibility due to performance having become overly onerous for the debtor 
(§ 27 5(2) CC) and the provision on adaptation of the contract to changed circumstances ren-
dering performance overly onerous for the debtor (§ 313(1) CC) has now caused considerable 
debate as regards their delimitation, see Schlechtriem, P. and Schmidt-Kessel, M., Schuldrecht 
- Allgemeiner Teil, 6th ed., Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2005, para. 485. 
78 See article 89(3)(a) CESL: "apply only if: (a) the change of circumstances occurred 
after the time when the contract was concluded". 
79 Article 89(1) CESL; see further Schwenzer et al., supra note 34, Paras. 45.111 et seq. 
80 Schwenzer, Ibidem, Paras. 45 .113 et seq. 
81 See for the solution offered under the CISG Schwenzer, I. in Schwenzer 2010 (supra 
note 9), Art. 79, Para. 54; I. Schwenzer, 'Force Majeure and Hardship in International Sales 
Contracts', Victoria University ef Wellington La,w Review, Val. 39, 2009, pp. 721 et seq„ p. 724; 
Schwenzer, I., 'Die clausula und das CISG', in Wiegand, W etal. (Eds.), Tradition mit Weitsicht 
- Festschriflfar Eugen Bucher zum 80. Geburtstag, pp. 736 et seq.; Schwenzer I. and Hachem, P. 
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4. lnterplay of Different Remedies 
The relationship between different remedies is of great importance. 82 As 
has been pointed out, remedies laid down under the CESL just as under the 
CISG in the special part relating to seller's and buyer's obligations are sub-
ject to certain restrictions, such as the examination and notice requirement, 83 
the fundamentality of the breach in case of avoidance84 or the foreseeability 
test in case of damages.85 Under the CESL, however, other remedies ex-
ist that may conflict with these remedies and their underlying concepts. 86 
Most notably, non-conformity of the goods may give rise to other remedies. 
Certainly, any buyer of non-conforming goods is mistaken as to the goods 
conforming to the contract. 87 Thus, if the prerequisites of Art. 48 CESL are 
met, the buyer may avoid the contract notwithstanding whether for example 
it gave timely notice of the non-conformity or whether the breach amount-
ed to a fundamental one. 88 Article 5 7 CESL explicitly provides that a party 
may pursue either one of the possible remedies.89 Further problems arise if 
the seller has failed to comply with any of its pre-contractual information 
duties which presumably usually will be alleged by buyers in case of non-
conformity of the goods. This not only triggers the remedy of avoidance 
due to mistake90 but furthermore entails liability for any loss caused to the 
other party by such failure which again may be claimed independently from 
and additionally to any other remedies for breach of contract. 91 Again, this 
stands in sharp contrast to the solution found under the CISG. As the CISG 
'The CISG - Successes and Pitfalls', American]ournal ef Comparative Law, Val. 57, 2009, pp. 
474, 475. 
82 See an the lacking hierarchy af remedies under CESL Samay & Dang Vu &Jansen 
2011 (supra note 55), pp. 869 et seq.; Feltkamp & Vanbassele 2011 (supra nate 13), pp. 891 et 
seq.; see generalfy Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra nate 34 ), Paras. 49.01 et seq. 
83 Arts. 38, 39 CISG; Arts. 121 et seq. CESL. 
84 Arts. 25, 49(1)(a) CISG; Arts. 87(2), 114(1) CESL. 
85 Art. 74 CISG; Art. 161 CESL. 
86 For general criticism an the lack af structure and caherence in the CESL's system af 
remedies see Samay & Dang Vu &Jansen 2011 (supra nate 55), pp. 861 et seq. 
87 See for a camparative averview Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra nate 34), 
Paras. 49 .15 et seq. 
88 The CESL thus follaws the pasitian found in the PECL and the DCFR; see Schwenzer 
& Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra nate 34), Para. 49.24. 
89 Far an overview af the different approaches that can be taken in this respect see Sch-
wenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 (supra nate 34), Paras. 49.11 et seq. 
90 Art. 48( 1 )(b )(ii) CESL. · 
91 Art. 29(1),(3) CESL. 
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itself governs neither mistake nor pre-contractual duties, it is a question of 
the possible relationship between CISG remedies and concurrent domestic 
remedies. In case law92 and doctrine, 93 it is now unanimously held that the 
CISG pre-empts all concurrent domestic remedies in this field. 
V. FrLLING THE GAPS 
In order to evaluate the appropriateness of the CESL, it is useful to also 
have a look at those areas of sales law that do not have a counterpart in the 
CISG. We shall now discuss how the CESL has filled these gaps. N aturally, 
only a few select subjects can be discussed here. 
1. Pre-contractual Duties and Liability 
The CISG, in principle, does not contain any rules on pre-contractual 
duties; a proposition to insert a provision on culpa in contrahendo was even re-
jected at the Vienna Conference. 94 · 
In contrast, the CESL has devoted a whole chapter to pre-contractual 
information duties. 95 First of all, a variety of information duties are estab-
lished which apply to B2C transactions only. 96 But also in a B2B contract, 
the seller has to give any information concerning the main characteristics 
of the goods which it has or can be expected to have and which would be 
contrary to good faith and fair dealing not to disclose to the other party.97 
In B2B contracts, such vague and extensive information duties seem to be 
92 Cf for France: Cass. civ. Ire, 14 May 1996, Jurisclasseur Periodique, Edition Generale, Vol. 
71, 1997, No. I-4009; for Austria: OGH, 13 April 2000, CISG-online 576, with a note by P. 
Schlechtriem, IPRax, Vol. 21, 2001, pp. 161 et seq.; seefurther the more recent US case Elec-
trocreft Arkansas, Inc. v. Super Electric Motors, Ltd., US Dist. Ct. E.D. Ark., 23 December 2009, 
CISG-online 2045. 
93 I. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 35, Paras. 46 et seq., Para. 48 with 
ref erences. 
94 See U.G. Schroeter, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Intro to Arts. 14-24, Paras. 54 et 
seq. 
95 Chapter 2, Arts. 13-29 CESL; see further C. Cravetto & B. Pasa, 'The 'Non-sense' of 
Pre-contractual Information Duties in Gase of Non-concluded Contracts', European Review 
ef Private Law, Vol. 19, 2011, pp. 761 et seq.; Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 276 
et seq.; in regard to the Feasibility Study see H. Beale & G. Howells, 'Pre-contractual Informa-
tion Duties in the Optional Instrument', in R. Schulze &J. Stuyck, Towards a European Contract 
Law, Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich, 2011, pp. 51 et seq. 
96 Arts. 13-22 CESL. 
97 Art. 23(1) CESL. 
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inappropriate and must necessarily lead to legal uncertainty that cannot be 
tolerated in international trade.98 Further pre-contractual information du-
ties are established for contracts concluded by electronic means, especially 
via websites.99 
lt has already been pointed out that the possibility to concurrently rely 
on remedies for breach of pre-contractual information duties is particularly 
problematic. 
2. Non-negotiated Terms 
The use of non-negotiated terms is, especially in international sales 
contracts, of great practical importance. 
The CISG does not even mention this notion. Now, however, due to 
more than twenty years of practical experience, it has been possible to carve 
out the essential solutions pertaining to non-negotiated terms. 100 
By contrast, the CESL even distinguishes between non-negotiated 
terms and standard contract terms. 101 For the latter it practically copies the 
German Civil Code102 and defines standard terms as :i1on-negotiated terms 
which have been formulated in advance for several transactions involving 
different parties. 103 The necessity for such a subtle distinction at best re-
mains obscure. 104 The dualism of two distinct concepts in this regard is un-
known to any legal system, be it on a domestic or on the European level. 105 
98 See S. Whittaker, 'The 'Draft Common Frame of Reference' - An Assessment', Report 
commissioned by the Ministry of Justice, United Kingdom, Oxford, 2008, pp. 100 et seq. 
99 Art. 24 CESL, applying to B2C and B2B contracts; Art. 25 CESL, unclear whether 
(3) may also be applied in B2B transactions. 
100 See V.G. Schroeter, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Intro to Arts. 14-24, Paras. 5 et 
seq., Art. 14, Paras. 32 et seq. 
101 Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 278 et seq.; H.-W Micklitz, ~Optional 
Law on Off-premises, Distance Sales and Unfair Terms for European Business and Con-
sumers?', in Micklitz & Reich 2012 (supra note 14), pp. 58 et seq.; in regard to the Feasibility 
Study's provisions on unfairness and non-negotiated terms see D. Mazeaud, 'Unfairness and 
Non-Negotiated Terms', in Schulze & Stuyck 2011 (supra note 95), pp. 123 et seq.; M.W Hes-
selink, 'Unfaix- Terms in Contracts Between Businesses', in Schulze & Stuyck 2011 (supra note 
95),pp.131 etseq. 
102 § 305(1) sentences 1, 3 CC. 
103 Art. 2( d) Regulation. 
104 Art. 7(3) CESL seems to imply the presumption that terms in standard contract terms 
are non-negotiated terms. 
105 See Art. 3 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Con-
sumer Contracts, which dispenses with the requirement that the terms have been drafted for 
use in more than one transaction. 
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The CESL contains a specific regime for non-negotiated terms and 
standard terms as regards the incorporation of such terms into the contract 
as weil as the judicial control of unfair terms. 
a) lncorporation 
On the level of incorporation, problems arise where non-negotiated 
terms are to be incorporated by reference. The CESL contents itself with 
the vague formula that the party supplying the terms must take reasonable 
steps to draw the other party's attention to them. 106 lt remains an open 
question whether, especially in B2B contracts, a mere reference to standard 
terms is enough. Furthermore, as the requirement of transparency does not 
apply in the B2B context, 107 it is unclear what requirements as to language 
etc. exist. 
Further difficulties arise with regard to the battle of forms. The provi-
sion dealing with this issue only applies to standard terms but not to mere 
non-negotiated terms. 108 lt is hard to see the underlying ratio of this ap-
proach. Regardless of this fact, this provision in essence does not add much 
to what is the prevailing opinion under the ClSG. 109 
b) Substantive Control 
Whereas under the ClSG the substantive control of (all) contract terms 
in principle is a question of validity and thus left to the applicable domestic 
law, 110 the CESL contains specific provisions for this matter. 111 As regards 
B2C contracts, in addition to a general clause 112 circumscribing unfairness, 
106 Art. 70(1) CESL. 
107 Art. 82 CESL only refers to B2C contracts. 
108 See the heading and wording of Art. 3 9 CESL. 
109 Under the Convention, the dispute has narrowed down to two approaches: the so-
called last-shot-doctrine and the so-called knock-out-doctrine. Under the first doctrine, the 
non-negotiated terms which have been sent last become part of the contract. Under the sec-
ond doctrine, conflicting terms are stricken out and replaced by the default rule. This second 
view has come to be the prevailing view under the CISG, see Cass. civ. lre, 16 July 1998, 
CISG-online 344; BGH, 9 January 2002, CISG-online 651; U.G. Schroeter, in Schwenzer 
2010 (supra note 9), Art. 19, Para. 36 with numerous references also for domestic laws and 
uniform projects. 
110 See Art. 4 sentence 2(a) CISG; I. Schwenzer & P. Hachem, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra 
note 9), Art. 4, Para. 30. 
111 For criticism see Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 278 et seq. 
112 Art. 83 CESL. 
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the CESL establishes a so-called black list of contract terms which are al-
ways unfair with 11 items113 and a so-called grey list of terms which are 
presumed to be unfair with 23 items. 114 As regards B2B contracts, the CESL 
contains a general clause only. 115 This provision slightly deviates from the 
concept of unfairness in B2C contracts and only applies to non-negotiated 
terms. 116 According to this definition, a non-negotiated term is unfair if it 
grossly deviates from good commercial practice contrary to good faith and 
fair dealing. This gives rise to scepticism from two perspectives: first, this 
concept is extremely vague and does not give any orientation on how to 
draft fair contract terms. Second, this provision insinuates that, in a B2B 
transaction, an individually negotiated term may never be regarded as be-
ing unfair; a solution that would significantly lag behind any domestic and 
international standard for a control of unfair terms even in B2B contracts. 117 
3. Interest 
A last lacuna under the CISG which is of great practical importance 
must be addressed here. Although the CISG provides that interest is due on 
any sum in arrears, 118 it does not state the applicable interest rate. 119 This 
has proven tobe a real obstacle to achieving uniformity. The CESL contains 
six provisions on interest on late payments. 120 In essence, it links the inter-
est rate to the one applied by the European Central Bank which is adjusted 
every six months, or an equivalent rate set by a national central bank. 121 
Two percentage points are added to this rate for any delayed payment; 122 
eight percentage points are added where a trader delays the payment of 
the purchase price. 123 All in all, this solution may meet with approval. Still, 
113 Art. 84 CESL. 
114 Art. 85 CESL; see further Micklitz 2012 (supra note 101 ), pp. 62 et seq. 
115 Art. 86 CESL; see Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 278 et seq. 
116 Art. 86 CESL. 
117 See Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 278 et seq.) also voicing criticism. 
118 Art. 78 CISG. 
119 See K. Bacher, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 78, Para. 2 with references. 
l20 Arts. 166-171 CESL. See on the provisions of the DCFR A. Fötschl, 'Zinsen auf 
ausservertragliche Geldforderungen im Rechtsvergleich und eine Analyse der Zinsnormen 
des Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR)', European Review ef Private Law, Val. 1 7, 
2009, pp. 106 et seq.; see further Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 283 et seq. 
121 Art. 166(2) CESL. 
122 Art. 166(2) CESL. 
123 Art. 168(1)(5) CESL. 
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two points deserve mentioning. First, there is an explicit provision allow-
ing for compensation for recovery costs, be it in the form of a lump sum 
of 40 Euros or as damages if the recovery costs exceed this sum. 124 Having 
special regard to the international discussion whether pre-trial attorney's 
fees should be compensated for, 125 this provision seems highly problematic. 
Furthermore, all rules on interest are mandatory126 which heavily impairs 
freedom of contract in this area. 127 
VI. CODIFYING STYLE AND TECHNIQUES 
As concerns the different codifying style and techniques of the CISG 
and the CESL, one is first struck by the sheer length of the CESL compared 
to the relatively short CISG. 128 This is partly due to the approach taken to-
wards definitions. Under the CISG, definitions are a rare exception. Their 
absence has not led to any problems. Contrary to the CISG, the Regulation 
itself contains a long list of definitions. 129 While it is laudable that the draft-
ers have attempted to achieve a common understanding of legal terms, it 
is hardly understandable why the text of the CESL again is packed with 
sometimes repetitive and sometimes further definitions. 130 
124 Art. 169 CESL. 
125 
.(apata Hermanons Sucessores, S.A. v. Hearthside Balcing Company, lnc., US Ct. App. (7th 
Cir.), 19 November 2002, CISG-online 684; see further Schwenzer & Hachem & Kee 2012 
(supra note 34), Paras. 44.166 et seq.; I. Schwenzer, in Schwenzer 2010 (supra note 9), Art. 7 4, 
Paras. 28 et seq.; CISG AC Opinion No. 6, 'Calculation of Damages under CISG Article 7 4', 
Rapporteur]. Gotanda, 2006, available at http://www.cisgac.com/default.php?ipkCat=l 28&ifkC 
at=l 48&sid=l 48, Comments 5.1 et seq. 
126 Art. 171 CESL. There seems to be a contradiction between Art. 170 CESL that deals 
with unfair terms relating to interest and Art. 1 71 CESL that prohibits any deviation from 
the statutory scheme. 
127 See also Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), pp. 283 et seq. 
128 Harsh criticism from U. Huber, 'Modellregeln für ein Europäisches Kaufrecht', .(EuP, 
Vol. 16, 2008, p. 742: "The provisions on sales law have tobe completely reformulated. [„.] 
The reader should not be given the impression that the drafters think it to be slow-witted". 
See also Eidenmüller et al., 'Der Gemeinsame Referenzrahmen für das Europäische Pri-
vatrecht - Wertungsfragen und Kodifikationsprobleme',Juristen .(eitung, Vol. 63, 2008, p. 549: 
"Reading the DCFR is tiring, because so much of its content is superfluous and because it 
contains numerous repetitions". 
129 Art. 2 Regulation. 
130 See for example Art. 7(1) CESL in addition to Art. 2(d) Regulation. See also Eiden-
müller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), p. 272, with further examples of repetitive clauses. 
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The sheer length of the CESL does not, however, contribute to clari-
ty.131 Although, in comparison to the DCFR, the CESL has been shortened 
considerably, the attempt to include as many scenarios as possible into the 
wording of the CESL has considerably inflated the texL This prolixity, how-
ever, has not prevented the drafters from an exorbitant132 use of general 
clauses. The CISG, although using much less general clauses, already has 
been criticized for its vagueness. 133 The CESL, from this viewpoint, will 
hardly be acceptable, 134 especially to Common Law lawyers. 135 
Finally, it is regrettable that the CESL does not use the same terminol-
ogy as the CISG. 136 The drafters of the CISG endeavoured to depart from 
domestic legal concepts, instead seeking an independent legal language. In-
deed, to a large extent, they succeeded. The CESL tries to reinvent the 
wheel by changing terminology that for almost thirty years now has become 
the lingua franca of international sales law. A prominent example, which is 
also crucial for trade practice, is the replacement of the term 'avoidance 
for breach of contract' used by the CISG with the term 'termination' in the 
CESL. The fact that the very term avoidance is used by the CESL in the con-
text of mistake is hardly helpful to ease communication. 137 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The CESL, as it has been published recently, is hardly an improvement 
to the CISG that is now in force in 23 states out of the 27 European Union 
131 See Eidenmüller et al. 2008 (supra note 128), p. 549; Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 
(supra note 13), p. 905; Huber 2008 (supra note 128), p. 742. 
132 See, in regard to the DCFR, Eidenmüller et al. 2008 (supra note 128), p. 536, who 
provide an impressive account of the excessive use of general clauses in the DCFR; see 
further Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), p. 905, voicing concern that the use of 
open-end clauses in CESL will not lead to a sufficient level of legal certainty. 
133 Against this criticism Schwenzer & Hachem 2009 (supra note 81), p. 467. 
134 See Feltkamp & Vanbossele 2011 (supra note 13), p. 905, according to whom the CESL 
is "not ripe for implementation". 
135 See for the concerns raised in the United Kingdom the Report issued by the European 
Union Committee of the House of Lords, European Contract Law: The Dreft Common Frame ef 
Reference - Report with Evidence, London, House of Lords, Stationary Office, 2009, Paras. 31 et 
seq. 
136 For criticism regarding the wording of the German version of CESL see Eidenmüller 
etal. 2012 (supranote 22),p. 272. 
137 We are aware that PICC and PECL follow the same terminology as the DCFR. How-
ever, both sets of rules do not contain specific provisions on sales law and already their de-
parture from the language of the CISG is most unfortunate. 
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member states. 138 lt has been shown that in many areas the differences can-
not satisfy the needs of international trade. 139 Many of these changes were 
highly inspired by the German Civil Code and its underlying l 9th century 
principles as weil as a strong desire for consumer protection, both of which 
do not provide an adequate framework for B2B transactions. 140 This is espe-
cially true for the abundant number of general clauses and vague terms. 141 
The recurrently emphasized principle of good faith certainly will not be 
regarded with favour by anyone coming from a Common Law country and 
does not add much to clarity and predictability - one of the principal neces-
sities in international trade. But this is not at all due to a stronger protection 
of commercial buyers under the CESL as alleged by the aim of the Regula-
tion. Instead, as has been shown, there are several instances where -with 
more clarity- the CISG offers buyers better protection than the CESL. 142 
All in all, the CESL does not provide a viable alternative to the CISG. 143 
Practice needs a simple uniform law for all international and domestic sales 
contracts. This is why many modern legislators, especially in Eastern Eu-
rope, modelled their domestic sales law according to the CISG. 144 The CESL 
being only an optional instrument on the European level, it is -at the very 
138 Ireland, Malta, Portugal and the United Kingdom have not ratified the Convention. 
A continuously updated overview of the Contracting States can be found at www.uncitral.org/ 
uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/sale_goods/ l 980CISG_status. html. 
139 For similar criticism already on the DCFR see Basedow, J., 'Kodifikationsrausch und 
kollidierende Konzepte -- Notizen zu Marktbezug, Freiheit und System im Draft Common 
Frame of Reference', .?,EuP, Vol. 16, 2008, pp. 673 et seq.; see further K. Riesenhuber, 'In-
formation über die Verwendung des Gemeinsamen Europäischen Kaufrechts', ,Zeitschriftfar 
Gemeinscheftsprivatrecht, Vol. 9, 2012, p. 5, raising the question whether CESL can achieve its 
goal of harmonization. 
140 For similar criticism see also Micklitz & Reich 2012 (supra note 14), p. 31, who con-
clude that the CESL should be limited to B2C transactions, thus excluding B2B contracting 
from its scope of application. 
141 See, in regard to the DCFR, L. Antoniolli & E Fiorentini &J. Gordley, 'A Case-based 
Assessment of the Draft Common Frame of Reference', Am. J Camp. L, Vol. 58, 2010, p. 
351. 
142 See the references to questions of notice, obviously unfounded claims, seller's general 
right to eure, non-economic loss etc. 
143 See Eidenmüller et al. 2012 (supra note 22), p. 285, who come to the same conclusion; 
see further Scottish Law Commission 2011 (supra note 22), p. 102. 
144 See Schlechtriem, P., '25 Years of the CISG: An International lingua franca for Draft-
ing Uniform Laws, Legal Principles, Domestic Legislation and Transnational Contracts', in 
Flechtner, H. et al. (Eds.), Drajting Contracts Under the CISG, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2008, pp. 167, 174, 177; Zoll, E, 'The Impact of CISG on Polish Law', Rabels ,Zeitschriftfar 
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least- doubtful whether any sensible trader will opt for it. 145 In essence, this 
would mean that sellers and buyers would need to adapt their contracts to 
three different situations: domestic, European and global. Furthermore, the 
experiences made with the PICC146 clearly show that parties do not make 
use of optional instruments in their choice of law clauses. 147 Whereas about 
80% of disputes resolved under the auspices of the ICC contain a choice 
of law clause, opting-in instruments such as the PICC are chosen in only 
0.8% of these contracts, although they may be weil appropriate to supple-
ment the CISG. 148 lt seems all the more improbable that parties would 
opt out of the CISG and into the CESL which in itself would have to be 
supplemented by domestic law. 
lt is regrettable that the European Union chose such a Sonderweg instead 
of maintaining its leading position in the development of the CISG and 
raising its voice in the global concert. With the CISG becoming more and 
more important on the global scale, it is important that any harmonisa-
tion or unification of laws in Europe ensures that the CISG remains un-
touched. Hopefully, however, UNCITRAL will take the lead and develop 
a set of rules of general contract law supplementing the CISG and thus 
filling the still existing gaps. Such a global contract law should be mod-
elled on the PICC and the PECL, but certainly not on the CESL. 
145 Lando, 0., 'Comments and Questions Relating to the European Commission's Pro-
posal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law', European Review ef Private Law, 
Val. 19, 2011, p. 720; seefarther C. Herresthal, 'Ein europäisches Vertragsrecht als Optionales 
Instrument', EuZW, Vol. 22, 2011, p. 8. 
146 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts; see the newest version 
of the PICO published in 2010, available at http://www.unidroit.org/english/principles/contracts/ 
princip les2010/blackletter2010-english.pdj. 
147 Mankowski, P., 'CFR und Rechtswahl', in M. Schmidt-Kessel (Ed.), Der Gemeinsame Re-
ferenzrahmen - Entstehung, Inhalte, Anwendung, Sellier European Law Publishers, Munich, 2009, 
p. 401; Lando 2011 (supra note 145), p. 720. 
148 Mankowski 2009 (supra note 14 7), p. 401. 
